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PROBING THE CAPITAL PROSECUTOR'S
PERSPECTIVE: RACE OF THE
DISCRETIONARY ACTORS
Jeffrey J. Pokorakt
I got stones in my passway
and all my roads seem dark at night
I got stones in my passway
and all my roads seem dark at night
I have pains in my heart
they have taken my appetite
- Robert Johnson, "Stones in My Passway"'
INTRODUMTION
Over half a century after blues singer RobertJohnson bemoaned
the "stones in [his] passway," a different RobertJohnson finds himself
in much the same position. This modem RobertJohnson, the district
attorney for the Bronx, sits at the center of a controversy that stems in
part from his own uniqueness. First, this RobertJohnson is an African
American-indeed the only minority district attorney in New York. 2
Second, this RobertJohnson was elected by his majority African Amer-
ican district on a platform of open opposition to the death penalty.3
In mid-March 1996 Kevin Gillespie, a police officer, was shot and
killed in the Bronx during a gun battle with suspected carjackers. 4
Almost immediately, New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Governor
George Patald clamored for the imposition of the state's newly en-
acted death penalty.5 Even before District AttorneyJohnson could as-
- Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Criminal Justice Clinic at St. Mary's
University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. I must extend my sincere appreciation to
Professors David Dittfurth and Marsha Cope Huie and to Pro Bono Program Director
Eden Harrington from St. Mary's University School of Law for all their help and support.
This project was made possible in part by a research stipend from St. Mary's University
School of Law.
1 ROBERT JOHNSON, Stones in My Passway, on ROBERT JOHNSON: TiH COMPLE RE-
CORDINGS (Columbia Records 1990).
2 See Table 1.
3 See Don Singleton & Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, DA Hit on Anti-Death Penalty View, DAILY
NEws (New York), Mar. 16, 1996, at 3 (characterizing Johnson as "[a]n outspoken oppo-
nent of capital punishment").
4 See Bob Kappstatter et al., Mayor, Gov Demand Gunmen's Execution, DAILY NEws (New
York), Mar. 16, 1996, at 3.
5 See Singleton & Fitz-Gibbon, supra note 3.
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sess the evidence and decide whether the death penalty would be
appropriate, Governor Pataki threatened to replace Johnson with
someone who would seek the death penalty without reservation. 6 The
dispute ended when the suspect hanged himself in jail.7
The incident, however, demonstrates the effect of race on the en-
forcement of the death penalty across the country. In this case, the
white governor of a majority white state, who strongly supports the
death penalty, threatened to replace an African American district at-
torney who won election from a majority African American commu-
nity on a platform opposing the death penalty. Another racial issue
further complicated the situation-the police officer-victim was white
and the assailant was Hispanic.8 Although it would be foolish to be-
lieve that race wholly motivated these events, it also would be equally
naive to suggest that race was irrelevant.
The threats of Governor Pataki and Mayor Giuliani to replace
Robert Johnson with a death penalty supporter raise the question of
who has the power to seek the death penalty in this country. This
inquiry becomes even more important in the context of the striking
racial disparities in the enforcement of the modern death penalty.9
Between 1976 and July 31, 1997, 403 persons were executed,' 0 repre-
senting 228 whites (56.6%), 147 blacks (36.5%), and twenty-three La-
tinos (5.7%)." In contrast, the victims of those executed include 455
whites (83.2%), sixty-six blacks (12.1%), and nineteen Latinos
(3.5%).12 This Article contributes to the efforts to explain this racial-
composition disparity between the nation's death row and its victim
populations by presenting a study of the race of prosecutors who pos-
sess the power to seek the death penalty. Based upon the results of
6 See id.
7 SeeJon R. Sorensen & Corky Siemaszko, Gov' DA Yank in Death Case Upheld, DAILY
NEWs (New York), Dec. 5, 1997, at 20.
8 SeeJorge Fitz-Gibbons and William K. Rashbaum, Vicious Gang of Robbers: Accused
Killers Preyed on Bodegas in Bronx, DAILY NEWS (New York), Mar. 16, 1996, at 8.
9 The Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), resulted
in a four-year legal ban on the death penalty. For the purposes of this Article, the phase
'modem death penalty period" dates from the Supreme Court's decisions in 1976 that
reinstated the death penalty, see Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Flor-
ida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
10 See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, DEATH Row U.SA. REPORTER 1040
(1997) [hereinafter DEATH Row U.S.A.]. Before 1984, only 11 people were executed in
the country: two in Florida, and one each in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Lousiana, Missis-
sippi, Nevada, Utah, Texas, and Virginia. See RaymondJ. Pascucci et al., Capital Punishment
in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 ComeELL L. REv. 1129, 1130 &
n.2 (1984).
11 See DEATH Row U.SA., supra note 10, at 1040. The number executed also includes
four Native Americans (1.0%) and one Asian (0.2%). See id.
12 See id. The victims of those executed also include seven Asians (1.3%). See id.
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this study, the Article then suggests that the existence of an uncon-
scious prosecutorial bias may contribute to this disparity.
PROSECUTORIAL DIsCRETION AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Prosecutorial discretion plays a pervasive role in the administra-
tion of criminal justice.' 3 Limited resources and crowded criminal
dockets force prosecutors to make quasijudicial decisions, regarding
whom to charge, the severity of the charge, whether to offer a plea
bargain, and whether to proceed to trial.14 Prosecutors exercise this
extensive power beyond public view, without objective criteria, and in
an "essentially unreviewable" manner.15 In fact, the presumption that
prosecutors act in good faith gives prosecutors virtual impunity in
their pretrial decisions. 16
The broad scope of capital statutes and the recent increase in
both the number and the type of capital crimes have expanded, by
necessity, the prosecutors' discretion.17 Of the many death-eligible
defendants, only a relatively small number actually will go to trial, and
even fewer will face a capital penalty trial.'8 Yet, in most cases, there
are no clear policies, procedures, or other objective criteria that gov-
ern the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 19 Prosecutors enjoy al-
most complete freedom to "decline to charge, offer a plea bargain, or
decline to seek a death sentence in any particular case.
20
With this prosecutorial freedom, however, comes the danger that
invidious considerations will prompt these death penalty decision
13 SeeJames Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1521,
1522 (1981).
14 See id. at 1524-25.
15 Id. at 1522.
16 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (noting that a prosecutor
has "broad discretion" to decide whether and for what purpose to prosecute an arrestee);
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) ("Whether to prosecute and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecu-
tor's discretion."). The prosecutor's discretion "is not 'unfettered'" because the
"[s]electivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is, of course, subject to constitutional
constraints" like the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 125 & n.9.
17 See John A. Horowitz, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a
Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2571, 2578 (1997)
("[Prosecutorial discretion] has increased as legislatures have broadened the criminal
code without providing prosecutors additional resources. With more conduct being con-
sidered criminal and a limited resource pool, prosecutors cannot enforce every criminal
statute. As a result, some crimes go unpunished .... " (footnotes omitted)).
18 See DAvID C. BALDus Er AL., EQUAL JUSTIcE AND THE DEATH PENALY 233-35 (1990)
(noting that "prosecutors .. .dominate the nation's capital-sentencing system" and fre-
quently do not seek the death penalty).
19 See Raymond Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A
Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination, 18 L. & Soc'y REv. 437, 471 (1984); Vorenberg,
supra note 13, at 152-37.
20 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) (footnote omitted).
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makers. These considerations may take the form of either a conscious
intent to discriminate or an "unconscious racial motivation" shaped by
"a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played
and still plays a dominant role."2 1
The Supreme Court dealt for the first time with the effect of race
on death penalty decision makers in McCleskey v. Kemp.22 In McCleskey,
the Court considered a comprehensive study ("Baldus Study"), which
showed serious racial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty
in Georgia.23 McCleskey claimed that these racial disparities demon-
strated systematic racism in capital sentencing.2 4 By a five-to-four vote,
the Court held that the general statistical studies did not provide suffi-
cient evidence that the decision maker impermissiblyhad considered
race in the defendant's particular case.25 Commentators, however,
have criticized the Court's narrow decision as the death penalty's Dred
Scott26 and have likened it to Plessy v. Ferguson,27 Korematsu v. United
States,28 and similar cases.29 Indeed, Justice Brennan clearly shared
these sentiments, writing in dissent in McCleskey:
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked his
lawyer whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die. A candid
reply to this question would have been disturbing. First, counsel
would have to tell McCleskey that few of the details of the crime or
of McCleskey's past criminal conduct were more important than the
fact that his victim was white. Furthermore, counsel would feel
bound to tell McCleskey that defendants charged with killing white
victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to death as
defendants charged with killing blacks. In addition, frankness
would compel the disclosure that it was more likely than not that
the race of McCleskey's victim would determine whether he re-
ceived a death sentence: 6 of every 11 defendants convicted of kill-
21 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious
Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1016, 1024 (1988) (condemning the ap-
proach of the Supreme Court and of other courts for "fail[ing] to attend to the impact of
unconscious racism"); Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judi-
cial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 509, 510 (1994)
(criticizing the Supreme Court for "accept[ing] the inevitability of racial bias in an area as
serious and final as capital punishment").
22 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
23 See id. at 286. For a presentation of the type of data the Court considered, see
BALDus ET AL., supra note 18, at 80-197 (discussing from an empirical perspective the influ-
ence of race on the imposition of the death penalty in the State of Georgia).
24 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
25 See id. at 297.
26 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
27 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
28 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
29 See Hugo Adam Bedau, Someday McCleskey Will Be Death Penalty's Dred Scott, L.A.
TiMEs, May 1, 1987, § 2, at 5.
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ing a white person would not have received the death penalty if
their victims had been black, while, among defendants with aggra-
vating and mitigating factors comparable to McCleskey's, 20 of
every 34 would not have been sentenced to die if their victims had
been black. Finally, the assessment would not be complete without
the information that cases involving black defendants and white vic-
tims are more likely to result in a death sentence than cases featur-
ing any other racial combination of defendant and victim. The
story could be told in a variety of ways, but McCleskey could not fail
to grasp its essential narrative line: there was a significant chance
that race would play a prominent role in determining if he lived or
died.30
In this area in which race plays such a vital role, one key piece of
information is noticeably absent: data on the race of those who pos-
sess the discretion to seek the death penalty. This study seeks to fill
this gap.
WHO DECIDES WHO Is DEATH ELIGiBLE?
The first phase of this project involved the collection of data on
those officials who have the power to prosecute capital offenses.
Though the title for these public officials differs from state to state,
this study uses the term "District Attorney" to denote the chief prose-
cuting official who holds the power to determine charging levels. The
data that this project gathered include the race of the District Attor-
neys, the manner in which they obtain office-by election or by ap-
pointment-, and the length of their terms of office. The study
covered the thirty-eight state jurisdictons31 with capital punishment
30 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
31 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (Supp. 1997); Asiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1105 (West
Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West
Supp. 1998); COLO. Ray. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-46a, -54b
(West Supp. 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA_ STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04,
775.082 (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(d) (1996); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4003, -
4004 (1997); 720 ILL. COmp. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-
2-3 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624 (1995); KY. REy. STAT. ANN. § 507.020
(Banks-Baldwin 1997); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 412 (Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.020 (West
Supp. 1998); MoNT. CODE ANN. §45-5-102 (1997); NEB. Ray. STAT. §§ 29-2520, -2524
(1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (1996); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM.
PROc. LAw § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1997); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.02 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.7, 701.9 (West
Supp. 1998); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.150 (Supp. 1996); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (West
Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
§ 23A- 27A4 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13 202 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202, 76-8-206 (Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-31 (Michie Supp. 1997); WASH. Ray. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West Supp. 1998);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101 (Michie 1997).
1998] 1815
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
statutes, excluding only the United States government 2 and
military.33
In each state, as far as practicable, the study compiled the data
and cross-checked them using two different study methods. Initially,
the project contacted each District Attorney and gathered the relevant
information. It then cross-checked the information with various other
corroborating sources, including central state repositories, state and
local bar associations, state public defender agencies, and state attor-
ney general offices. This portion of the inquiry covered data from
October 1993 until February 1998. The study computed the racial
percentages of the District Attorneys in each of the thirty-eightjuris-
dictions, compiling the results into Table 1. Because some District
Attorneys have authority over several jurisdictions and because some
states have judicial districts or circuits that include or exclude a
number of counties in the state, the percentages reflect the number
of District Attorneys, not the number of counties or judicial districts,
as of February 1998. In addition, the number, as well as the racial and
ethnic identity, of the death row inmates in each state, if known, is
included to provide a simple correlation. 34
The second phase of this project compared the District Attorney
population of each state with the 1990 United States Census data for
that state. The 1990 Census lists the main categories of races as
"white," "black," "American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut," and "Asian or
Pacific Islander" and includes the Hispanic population as an ethnic
subgroup of these populations.35 For instance, the Census identifies
"[w]hite[, n]ot of Hispanic origin" as a category.36 By using the per-
centage of identified white inhabitants as the base to calculate the dif-
ference between the white, Hispanic, and other minority populations,
this study isolates Hispanics as an ethnic subgroup of the larger white
population. This study does not separate Hispanics from other popu-
lations, such as Native Americans or blacks because it intends to high-
light only the racial disparity between the District Attorneys and the
general population. Table 2 expresses these figures.
32 Of course, Attorneys General for the United States Government, appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, all have been white, and with the
exception of the current Attorney General, Janet Rento, all have been male.
33 As ofJuly 31, 1997, eight persons await execution by the United States military: five
blacks, one white, and two Asians. See DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 10, at 1082. Fifteen
await the same fate from the United States government nine blacks, four whites, one La-
tino, and one Asian. See id.
34 The figures in the analysis indicate the number of inmates on death row in each
state as of July 31, 1997. See DEATH Row U.SA., supra note 10, at 1050-81.
35 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION 3
tbl.3 (1992).
36 1 id.
1816 [Vol. 83:1811
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TABLE I
RAcIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEATH PENALTy DECISION MAKERS AND
DEATH Row POPULATIONS
Death penalty
decision makers statewide
White Black Hispanic
Number (%) (%) (%)
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
NewJersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Wyoming
40 97.5 2.5
15 100.0 0.0
24 100.0 0.0
58 95.0 0.0
22 95.5 0.0
12 100.0 0.0
3 100.0 0.0
20 95.0 0.0
46 97.8 2.2
44 100.0 0.0
102 100.0 0.0
92 97.8 1.1
105 99.0 1.0
56 100.0 0.0
40 97.5 2.5
25 92.0 8.0
22 95.5 4.5
115 100.0 0.0
57' 98.3 0.0
89 100.0 0.0
17 100.0 0.0
10 100.0 0.0
21 95.2 4.8
14 64.3 0.0
62 98.4 1.6
39 94.9 5.1
88 98.9 1.1
27b 96.3 0.0
36 100.0 0.0
67 100.0 0.0
16 93.8 6.2
66 100.0 0.0
31 100.0 0.0
148 92.6 0.0
29 100.0 0.0
121 93.4 6.6
39 100.0 0.0
22 100.0 0.0
Death row population
White Black Hispanic
Number (%) (%) (%)
153 58.8 39.9 0.7
125 65.6 12.0 16.8
35 48.6 42.9 5.7
474 35.9 31.4 12.5
5 40.0 40.0 20.0
4 50.0 50.0 0.0
14 42.9 57.1 0.0
350 54.9 35.1 9.1
109 56.9 43.1 0.0
19 100.0 0.0 0.0
171 32.8 62.0 2.9
45 66.7 31.1 2.2
0 - - -
28 79.0 25.0 0.0
64 26.6 68.8 4.7
17 17.7 82.4 0.0
64 43.8 56.3 0.0
96 55.2 44.8 0.0
7 100.0 0.0 0.0
11 72.7 18.2 0.0
84 48.8 39.3 9.5
0 - - -
19 47.4 47.4 5.3
4 75.0 0.0 25.0
0 - - -
193 45.6 49.7 0.5
180 47.8 48.9 1.7
123 56.1 30.1 2.4
24 83.3 4.2 0.0
210 31.0 62.4 5.7
73 43.8 54.8 0.0
2 100.0 0.0 0.0
107 63.6 32.7 0.0
372 40.6 37.9 18.0
10 70.0 20.0 10.0
43 41.9 55.8 2.3
11 81.8 9.1 0.0
0 - - -
Montana has one Native American prosecutor, representing 1.7% of the total.
b Oklahoma has one Native American prosecutor, representing 3.7% of the total.
TABLE HIGHLIHTS
The study reveals that the prosecutors with ultimate charging dis-
cretion in death penalty states are almost entirely white. Of the 1838
total prosecutors in death penalty states, 1794 are white (97.5%),
twenty-two are black (1.2%), and twenty-two are Hispanic (1.2%). In
fact, in eighteen of the thirty-eight death penalty states, whites corn-
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TABLE 2
RACIAL. CHARACTERISTICS OF DEATH PENALTY DECISION MAKERS AND
THE OVERALL STATE POPULATION
Death penalty
decision makers statewide Overall state population
White Black Hispanic White Minority(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Alabama 97.5 2.5 0.0 73.3 26.7
Arizona 100.0 0.0 0.0 71.7 28.3
Arkansas 100.0 0.0 0.0 82.2 17.8
California 95.0 0.0 5.0 57.2 42.8
Colorado 95.5 0.0 4.5 80.7 19.3
Connecticut 100.0 0.0 0.0 83.8 16.2
Delaware 100.0 0.0 0.0 79.3 20.7
Florida 95.0 0.0 5.0 73.2 26.8
Georgia 97.8 2.2 0.0 70.1 29.9
Idaho 100.0 0.0 0.0 92.2 7.8
Illinois 100.0 0.0 0.0 74.8 25.2
Indiana 97.8 1.1 1.1 89.6 10.4
Kansas 99.0 1.0 0.0 88.4 11.6
Kentucky 100.0 0.0 0.0 91.7 8.3
Louisiana 97.5 2.5 0.0 65.8 34.2
Maryland 92.0 8.0 0.0 69.6 30.4
Mississippi 95.5 4.5 0.0 63.1 36.9
Missouri 100.0 0.0 0.0 86.9 13.1
Montana 98.3 0.0 0.0 91.8 8.2
Nebraska 100.0 0.0 0.0 92.5 7.5
Nevada 100.0 0.0 0.0 78.7 21.3
New Hampshire 100.0 0.0 0.0 97.3 2.7
New Jersey 95.2 4.8 0.0 74.0 26.0
New Mexico 64.3 0.0 35.7 50.4 49.6
New York 98.4 1.6 0.0 69.3 30.7
North Carolina 94.9 5.1 0.0 75.0 25.0
Ohio 98.9 1.1 0.0 87.1 12.9
Oklahoma 96.3 0.0 0.0 81.0 19.0
Oregon 100.0 0.0 0.0 91.0 9.0
Pennsylvania 100.0 0.0 0.0 87.7 12.3
South Carolina 93.8 6.2 0.0 68.5 31.5
South Dakota 100.0 0.0 0.0 91.2 8.8
Tennessee 100.0 0.0 0.0 82.6 17.4
Texas 92.6 0.0 7.4 60.6 39.4
Utah 100.0 0.0 0.0 91.2 8.8
Virginia 93.4 6.6 0.0 76.0 24.0
Washington 100.0 0.0 0.0 86.7 13.3
Wyoming 100.0 0.0 0.0 92.0 8.0
prise 100% of the prosecutors. 37 In contrast, 1538 of the 3269 people
on death row are white (47.1%), 1340 are black (41.0%), and 227 are
Latino (6.9%).38
This study thus suggests two ways in which unconscious bias
might enter the system. The first and most obvious channel for this
37 The 18 states are as follows: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
38 See DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 10, at 1040.
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bias arises from the racial disparity between the prosecutors and the
death row population. The predominantly white prosecutors are
more likely to have absorbed the "cultural stereotype" of black inferi-
ority39 and thus perceive black defendants as more "violent" and more
"dangerous" than their white counterparts. The dynamic of this dis-
parity may help explain the Baldus study's finding that black defend-
ants are 1.1 times more likely to receive a death sentence than
defendants of other races.40
The second and more subtle expression of unconscious bias may
result from the similarity between the prosecutor and the victim popu-
lations. The victim population's racial makeup, 83.2% white, 12.1%
black, and 3.5% Latino, 41 resembles the prosecutor population's
more closely than it resembles the death row prisoner population's.
As a result, unconscious bias may creep into the prosecutors' decisions
to seek the death penalty. The predominantly white prosecutors may
perceive violent crimes against whites as more serious than similar
crimes against minorities and thus seek the death penalty more fre-
quently against defendants accused of killing white victims. Con-
versely, white prosecutors may have an unconscious perception of
blacks as inferior and may view violent crimes against blacks as less
serious and less worthy of the death penalty than similar crimes
against whites. The similarity of the prosecutor and victim popula-
tions may help explain the Baldus study's finding that "prosecutors
seek the death penalty for 70% of black defendants with white victims,
but for only 15% of black defendants with black victims, and only 19%
of white defendants with black victims." 42
CONCLUSION
Since the decision in McCleskey, numerous studies have confirmed
the racial disparities in death sentencing43 and have produced over-
whelming evidence that the primary source of arbitrary and discrimi-
natory decision making in capital cases rests with the prosecutor.
Despite this evidence, the MCleskey Court refused to address seriously
the role that prosecutorial bias plays in death sentencing. Instead, the
majority chose to reaffirm the traditional discretion of prosecutors. In
extolling the Court's "'unceasing efforts' to eradicate racial prejudice
from our criminal justice system," 44 the majority apparently mistook
39 See Lawrence, supra note 21, at 323.
40 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987).
41 See DATH Row U.SA., supra note 10, at 1040.
42 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 327.
43 See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial The Tolerance of Racial Dis-
crimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. Ray. 433, 434-35 (1995).
44 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986)).
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the effort for the deed and ignored the dangers of discrimination,
which are inherent in the system's unfettered prosecutorial discretion.
This study considers and treats seriously an area in which the
Supreme Court has failed: addressing the special dangers of uncon-
scious bias in prosecutors' life and death decisions. Knowing who
wields this discretionary power gives academics, practitioners, courts,
and legislatures the information needed to fashion a system that
strives to minimize prejudicial influences and to maximize fairness in
this potentially life-ending decision.
